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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a case study of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil and the 2016 Olympic 
Games in Rio de Janeiro to explore infrastructure development and physical legacies connected 
to the planning, bidding and staging of mega sporting events. Primary data was collected in 
Cuiabá in two phases during the 2014 World Cup and after the event in 2015. This entailed 
participant observation, structured observation, document analysis and 15 semi-structured 
interviews with the local population, as well as current and former government and stadium 
employees. Following the Rio 2016 Olympic Games primary data was collected from Porto 
Maravilha, Rio de Janeiro. In January 2018, 15 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 
tour operators and cultural businesses. Significant evidence indicates the ineffectiveness of urban 
and rural infrastructure development and facility improvements, delays and cancellations in 
infrastructure programmes, stadiums and venues overshooting their original costs and budgetary 
requirements, and controversial targeted transport interventions. Practical managerial 
recommendations and strategies are offered to aid the implementation, management and 
maintenance of host city infrastructure during the planning, bidding, hosting and post-sporting 
event phases.  
Key words: Mega sport event (MSE); Infrastructure; Legacy; Event planning and policy; 
Brazil 2014; Rio 2016; Cuiabá; Porto Maravilha. 
  
Copyright © Cognizant Communication Corporation  3 
MS 19 030 Event Management E-pub 
INTRODUCTION 
Over recent years, ‘Global South’ cities and nations have increased their bidding 
activities in an attempt to compete to host a range of mega sporting events (Haferburg & 
Steinbrink, 2017; Maharaj, 2015). The primary justifications for wishing to stage these global 
events is that they can function as tools for progressing and levering major economic revenue 
streams, re-shaping infrastructure, exploiting tourism demand, and expanding urban upgrade 
projects throughout the host city or nation (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Jones, 2001; Müller, 2012; 
Thornley, 2002). Successful bids have been tabled by the emerging markets of Brazil, Russia and 
South Africa, who have intentionally pursued strategies to fast track infrastructure construction 
programmes which address a lack of basic physical structures and sporting facilities (Gaffney, 
2015; Haferburg & Steinbrink, 2017; Müller, 2012; Silvestre, 2016). 
Whilst frameworks to test and measure legacies have been discussed, particularly in 
academic circles (e.g. Dickson, Benson & Blackman, 2011; Kassens-Noor, Wilson, Müller, 
Maharaj & Huntoon, 2015), we argue these evaluations tend to fall short politically due to the 
lengthy period of time needed to evaluate the success of sporting event legacies (Carlsen & 
Taylor, 2003). Tensions are prevalent between these evaluation processes and the political 
justification for short-term legacy results. Coakley and Souza (2013) suggest event legacies are 
envisaged, debated and created in the political actions of the bid preparation. We align with this 
notion and use the pre-event phase as our focus for this short-term legacy assessment. 
This article tracks the infrastructure impacts and legacy of two mega sporting events 
(MSEs) in Brazil within a two year period. Brazil hosted the 2014 FIFA Football World Cup and 
the Rio 2016 Olympic Games, a feat not previously achieved by any other country (Li, 2013), 
and therefore offers an opportunity to analyse the two events within the context of the same 
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country. In doing so, the article makes two contributions to the literature. First, our paper 
responds to calls for examinations on the Global South MSE experience (Maharaj, 2015). 
Second, we contribute to knowledge surrounding how the pre-event forces are enacted in the 
‘glocal’ production of sporting infrastructure and how that influences the post-event 
infrastructure legacy (Horne, 2011; Thomson, Schlenker & Schulenkorf, 2013). The paper now 
unfolds as follows: in the next section, we begin by reviewing the literature on pre-event, bidding 
and planning ambitions in a number of locations. Infrastructure, venue development and 
budgetary management are outlined and assessed in relation to recent men’s FIFA football 
World Cups and Olympic Games. Following this, we present our case studies and discuss the 
results pertaining to pre-event evaluations and post-event legacies. Finally, managerial 
implications, practical recommendations and further research directions are proposed. 
Hosting Mega Sporting Events: Budgets, Infrastructure and Urban Development 
Cities, regions and nations have long been drawn to hosting MSEs for their plethora of 
positive social and economic benefits. However, there is now a growing literature which warns 
that some hosts have experienced negative socio-economic outcomes (Preuss, 2007, 2015). For 
example, initial costs and budgets for a host city or region can be hopeful and linked to economic 
predictions which are frequently overstated, resulting in a failure to materialise long-term 
tangible benefits (Cashman & Horne, 2013; Preuss, 2009). The funding of these projects often 
culminates in hosting regions accepting enormous debts connected to infrastructure development 
and maintenance (Thomson et al., 2013). Li (2013) separated the infrastructure requirements for 
large-scale sporting events into two categories. Specific infrastructure established primarily for 
the event (e.g. stadia and accommodation for athletes). Moreover, the second category accounted 
for infrastructure essential for hosting the event, such as transportation systems (Li, 2013; Searle, 
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2012). Cabral & Silva (2013) extended this to include the use of ancillary facilities, which they 
emphasised to incorporate museums and convention centres located nearby stadiums. Preuss 
(2009) argues it is often these ancillary facilities which form a positive legacy, although the 
future operational costs are largely underestimated (Mills & Rosentraub, 2013). 
Substantial budgets and resources are needed to develop the appropriate sporting, 
transport and ancillary infrastructure which commonly leads to a reliance on public expenditure 
and subsidies from taxpayers (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Mills & Rosentraub, 2013; Preuss & 
Schnitzer, 2015). These funds can be diverted from social and environmental programmes to the 
development of sporting infrastructure (Cabral & Silva, 2013; Jones, 2001; Li, 2013; Preuss, 
2009). In turn, most large-scale facility and venue constructions are justified on the basis of their 
prospective benefit to the economy and local participation levels post-event (Gaffney, 2015). 
Searle (2002) noted that this relocation of spending and resources could have negative impacts 
on urban development in other areas of the city or region. Hence, understanding locals’ 
perceptions in pre-event periods, engaging the host community in the decision making processes, 
and securing locals’ MSE support are seen as critical success attributes (Michopoulou & 
Giuliano, 2018; Pappas, 2018; Ritchie, 2000). For example, in response to accusations of 
facilities becoming ‘white elephants’ after the event, where the stadia are underused, some 
structures are designed to be dismantled after the event or reduced in capacity (Gratton & Preuss, 
2008; Li, 2013; Müller, 2012; Thornley, 2002). 
Towards Theorising the Importance of Pre-event Evaluation for Legacy 
In the MSE lifecycle - bidding, planning and preparation, event delivery and post-event 
wrap up and handover (Hiller, 1998; Kirby, Duignan & McGillivray, 2018), legacy is broadly 
accepted as occurring in the post-event stage and incorporates the events context, temporal 
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nature of planning and positive and negative aspects that form in the hosting region (Preuss, 
2007, 2015; Thomson et al., 2013). The above studies, like most examinations on legacies, 
predominantly focus on the immediate post-event outcomes. Coakley and Souza (2013) suggest 
rather than measuring the legacy outcomes at the post-event stage, there is room to evaluate the 
processes in the pre-event stage and identify the factors which may detract favourable legacy 
outputs. To understand how legacies are formed, it is important to recognise the actors who have 
power to influence the development of legacy plans. In his evaluation of Brazil, India and South 
Africa, Maharaj (2015) found the public had little or no consultation as costs escalated and the 
poorest became increasingly adversely constrained by the MSEs. He recognised the relationship 
between the private and public sector controlling the flow of capital and direction of activities 
during the planning and construction phases. On the other hand, Nunkoo, Ribeiro, Sunnassee and 
Gursoy (2018) developed a theoretical framework associated with public trust in institutions 
organising mega sporting events. They posit corruption, transparency and knowledge as 
influential dimensions upon the levels of public trust and retaining or restoring this trust requires 
multiple stakeholder engagement and political will. Furthermore, the authors establish that public 
trust should form an integral part of any future bid package, but to date, organisers have failed to 
appreciate such elements. Other researchers such as Henne (2015) argue that little is known 
about the consequences of transparency and corruption linked to MSEs, and empirical 
infrastructure analysis is scant within MSE studies (Li, 2013). Therefore, we address this gap by 
analysing the impact of pre-event organisation on the legacy of two events. Specifically, we 
focus on two host territories Cuiabá (Brazil 2014 FIFA World Cup) and Porto Maravilha, Rio de 
Janeiro (Rio 2016 Olympic Games). 
Brazilian Political and Policy Environment 
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Brazil is unique in the social and political context in which the two mega sporting events, 
Brazil 2014 and Rio 2016, took place. Politics is closely aligned to functioning components of 
society within Brazil; military dictatorship is still in living memory, and senior political officials 
are involved in ongoing national corruption investigations, which led to the 2015 impeachment 
of President Dilma and imprisonment of former President Lula (Cowie, 2018). This is set against 
the backdrop of over 1 million people taking to the streets in 2013 to protest against hosting the 
2014 World Cup (Watts, 2013). In Rio, there were similar anti Olympic Games street marches 
and protests. Ultimately, the public was voicing their concerns on public spending for event 
infrastructure (e.g. stadiums) when health and education needed to take priority. Although a 
country at peace, Brazil’s internal politics and social divisions are stark (Korstanje, Tzanelli & 
Clayton, 2014), therefore offering a contested terrain in which politics played a significant role in 
the planning, running and evaluation of the two MSEs.  
In recent times, comparable to the internal political implosion in Brazil, the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), has 
come under increased scrutiny over costly host outlays and the lack of transparency in how these 
‘regimes’ award bidding contracts to host cities. In particular, FIFA have struggled to cope with 
corruption scandals, facing a public backlash and garnering attention from the press which has 
ensured that their problematic reputation remains a continual issue (Horne & Silvestre, 2016). 
Both the IOC and FIFA have tried to counter-act these claims by aligning themselves with the 
global discourse on sustainable development, declaring their flagship events are socially and 
environmentally beneficial (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012). 
The politics within the government and arrangements with international organising 
bodies were fundamental to the special political circumstances which the paper discusses. This 
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paper takes a chronological perspective and charts how Cuiabá and Rio de Janeiro were selected 
for, prepared and hosted these events. As such, we have proposed a conceptual framework to 
visualise the creation and development of planned infrastructure goals (see Figure 1). The ‘Host 
Event Project Planning for Infrastructure’ (HEEPI) Nexus presents and delineates the planning 
processes enlisted throughout the bidding protocols of the two Brazilian MSEs. A number of 
planning dimensions must be prioritised for the hosting of the event to go ahead. For instance, 
constructing venues, upgrading facilities and/or delivering stadia renovations. Simultaneously a 
range of factors act as an external force on the operations of the MSE. This includes the host city 
or region’s physical location, the current economic outlook and the extent to which politicians 
possess a final say in key event decisions. A constellation of external contingent actors impart 
and influence the trajectory of the MSE with their divergent perspectives e.g. public authorities 
or state-run departments. Other agreements like the host city contract (HCC) are activated 
between the private sport’s governing body (e.g. IOC) and local host city. Additionally, the 
representation of the host region is mediated through their involvement with prominent 
international corporations and global press outlets. 
<<<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>>> 
METHOD 
The study is informed by empirical data collected by the two researchers from the most 
recent mega sporting events held in Brazil - the 2014 FIFA World Cup and Rio 2016 Olympic 
Games. We present case studies of the two cities, Cuiabá (World Cup) and Porto Maravilha, Rio 
de Janeiro (Olympic Games) to illustrate contextual similarities and differences in a bounded 
time-scale, determined by the wider socio-economic circumstances (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2009). It is acknowledged that the results from these cases cannot be generalised to all 
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host cities but reflect the types of issues which host cities might encounter. They are therefore 
presented as standalone examples. 
According to Yin (2018), there are four testing criteria for judging the quality of case 
study research design. These include construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. These tests for quality were applied throughout the collection of primary and 
secondary sources and triangulation was used to ensure the validity of sources. Validity in the 
primary data collection was maintained through the recruitment of a wide spectrum of state, 
corporate and local community actors.  
The second author collected data on the 2014 FIFA World Cup host city of Cuiabá, 
capital city of Mato Grosso. 11 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Cuiabá was undertaken in 
two phases between 2014 and 2015. The first phase coincided with the World Cup tournament 
and focused on the preparation of the tournament, whilst the second phase in 2015 focused on 
the short-term infrastructure and legacy impacts. 15 semi-structured interviews were held with 
the local population, current and former government and stadium employees. Documentary 
analysis was conducted on mainstream press and social media reports, official government, FIFA 
documentation, and unofficial blogs of residents in Cuiabá. Structured observation of the 
stadium, airport and light railway system line were undertaken in 2014 and 2015 and participant 
observation was used to support or challenge the various claims by actors. Triangulation was an 
essential aspect of data collection and analysis of data came from a multitude of sources 
(Atkinson, 2015).  
The portion of the study conducted in Rio de Janeiro by the first researcher mirrored the 
15 semi-structured interviews conducted by the second researcher. Interviews were delivered 
with tourism and cultural organisations in January 2018 to uncover insights into the post-Rio 
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2016 Games physical infrastructure legacies. Over the course of a three-week period, 1700 
photographs were obtained, this was supplemented by regular videos - nine individual online 
videos were created altogether. Approaches to ethnographic techniques generated knowledge and 
themes using visual data (photographs), web-based tools and digital video recordings (e.g. vlogs) 
to represent the researchers’ experience and issues relating to MSE infrastructure outcomes 
(Pink, 2013). Moreover, the first author undertook and analysed a range of host city materials 
including official bidding plans, local authority/government and non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) reports. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Case Study: The 2014 World Cup Host City of Cuiabá 
Cuiabá, the capital of Mato Grosso, is situated in the centre-west region of Brazil (Crabb, 
2018, see Figure 2). During the bid phase, Cuiabá was one of 18 Brazilian cities who bid to host 
the 2014 World Cup. In a FIFA inspection, Cuiabá was one of 6 cities thought to not have the 
appropriate infrastructure and therefore could not host the World Cup (FIFA, 2007). However, in 
2009, Cuiabá was announced as a host city, a coup largely achieved through political 
manoeuvring and use of personal networks of state level elites, some of whom travelled to 
Switzerland to liaise with FIFA officials (Wilson, 2014). As a peripheral city, there was a 
consolidated infrastructure development programme, including a new stadium (Arena Pantanal) 
to achieve international environmental certification and a new light railway system linking the 
stadium to key areas within the city. However, these two projects were beset with problems from 
the start. 
<<<FIGURE 2 HERE>>> 
Arena Pantanal Construction and Delivery 
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The initial bid package sent to FIFA was prepared by local architectural firm Castro 
Mello; they were also contracted by the Mato Grosso government to produce architectural 
drawings for the new stadium in the preparation phase. These drawings were never produced and 
before Cuiabá were declared as hosts, mismanagement had cost the tax payer R$500,000 (BRL 
R$) or £117,361 (Bess, 2013). Cuiabá were given host city status in 2009, construction started in 
early 2010 but was temporarily suspended in November 2010 after Mato Grosso state auditors 
prevented funding from the state government due to irregularities with the budget (Tavares, 
2011). In addition, the preparation phase was also tarnished by the change of seat supplier. The 
contract to supply the seats was won in July 2013 by a Cuiabá based company, Kango. They 
were to supply 44,500 seats at a cost of R$19.4 million (£4,553,608). An investigation by the 
civil prosecution service advised the cancellation of the contract as they found Kango supplied 
the National Stadium in Brasilia at R$175 (£39.14) each. As a result of this investigation Kango 
lost the contract to another company, Desk, who quoted the state government R$150 (£35.21) 
per seat. Due to inconsistencies related to another contract in Sao Paulo, the company were not 
permitted to hold a contract with a government based enterprise for five years. At this point in 
2013, the original company, Kango, had their contract reinstated after they offered their original 
contract at a 6% discount. A new contract was then drawn up and Kango stated the seats would 
be installed by 2015 unless a premium was paid (Segalla, 2013). 
Although the event delivery phase was successful, the post-event phase of the cycle has 
been controversial. Since the 2014 Brazil World Cup, the stadium has been chronically 
underused, primarily due to construction problems still not being resolved. The stadium was 
closed in January 2015 due to flooding caused by the wet season. By 2016 the official capacity 
of the stadium was reduced to 10,000 (Pablo, 2016). On the 15th July 2016, the Mato Grosso 
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government blocked R$28 million (£6,572,219) to the construction company Santa Barbara and 
Mendes Junior after they had not completed the agreed works (Pablo, 2016). In 2016, only 
R$100,000 had been made from events with an average crowd of 766 for the local football team, 
compared to monthly maintenance costs of R$600,000. In January 2017, a survey was 
undertaken to assess the main problems of the stadium. Findings of this survey revealed the 
sound system was not fully-functioning, obvious flooding in the dressing rooms from the wet 
season and homeless squatters occupying the restaurant areas (Rimoli, 2018). One resident 
summarised their feelings “I am so sad when I look at the stadium, it could have been so 
beautiful, but corruption is everywhere. Welcome to Brazil, welcome to my city” (interview 3). 
VLT Infrastructure Programme 
The other main infrastructure project, the railway system (VLT), was contentious from 
the outset of the bid phase (see Figure 3). When the original bid package was created in 2009, the 
state government intended to build a railway system in the city. After consultation they revised 
the plans and developed a bus expressway, costing R$488.8million (£114,732,167). In 2011, a 
new state government travelled to Porto, Portugal and after witnessing their train system decided 
to re-instate the train plans at a cost of R$1.477 billion (£346,684,555). It was thought the VLT 
would promote Cuiabá as a modern city (Farinha, 2011). The former governor who endorsed the 
bus expressway gave his perspective on the change, “it was obvious to everyone the VLT was too 
expensive, we didn’t need it. We needed more buses with more routes. The route of the VLT 
would not help the congestion in the down town area, that is why we chose the bus expressway” 
(interview 7). Cuiabá was the smallest 2014 Brazil Football World Cup host city and is suggested 
to have suffered the most extensive government infrastructure project intervention (Gaffney, 
2015). The preparation phase was beset with problems and this resulted in the train system not 
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being in place by the event delivery phase. The widened roads ready for the installation remained 
unfinished and large stretches of the road contained high fencing which was still visible 
throughout the tournament (see Figure 4-1 and 4-2). A commuter reflected on the impact of the 
transport developments on her daily life: “I use the bus every day, but it takes so long. The buses 
are old, so the windows have to be open, but the fumes from the traffic jams make the air 
horrible. This VLT should have been finished months ago, but it’s barely started” (interview 12). 
<<<FIGURE 3 HERE>>> 
<<<FIGURES 4-1 and 4-2 HERE>>> 
Works were still not concluded in the post-event phase. This is a consequence of 
contractual disputes, and delays in the construction of the VLT system which stopped in 
December 2014, and to date has yet to restart. In September 2016, the only actor bought to 
account for the corruption in the construction of the stadium and the VLT was the Governor 
during that period. Governor Silval Barbosa was responsible for signing off contracts and 
releasing funds. He was at the centre of a corruption investigation in June 2014 where he was 
initially arrested but released on bail. As part of the police investigation ‘Sodom’, Silval was 
later arrested again in September 2015. This investigation sought to uncover claims that the state 
government defrauded the federal government by falsely claiming grants. Barbosa is said to have 
endorsed 34 contracts as Governor of Mato Grosso, including RS1.4 billion (£328,610,953) for 
the VLT, of which, R$500 million (£117,361,054) was said to be distributed to his colleagues 
(Ultimo Segundo, 2017). 
Case Study: Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Porto Maravilha’s Urban Development Programme 
Porto Maravilha was deployed through urban regeneration projects to remodel ambitious 
reforms of the old industrial and historic port (Carvalho, 2016: Guerra, Ferreira & Kipnis, 2018). 
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The ‘Marvellous Port’ revitalisation of the harbour and downtown areas can be credited to the 
Eduardo Paes administration, who was the former mayor of the city from 2009-2017 (Carvalho, 
2016). Urban development strategies amounted to infrastructure costs of R$8 billion covering an 
area of five million square metres (see Figure 5), incorporating the docklands, VLT transport 
implementation and the opening of new boulevards and squares e.g. the Olympic Boulevard 
(CDURP, 2016; Guerra, Ferreira & Kipnis, 2018; Rio de Janeiro City Government, 2014; 
Silvestre, 2016). In preparation for the Olympics, the revitalisation of the port district was 
designated as one of the main legacies, and a neoliberal experiment to capture the city (Ribeiro 
& Junior, 2017). Ancillary infrastructure was also planned, including the Rio Museum of Art 
(Museu de Arte do Rio - MAR) and the Museum of Tomorrow (Guerra, Ferreira & Kipnis, 
2018). The Rio Museum of Art opened before the start of the 2014 World Cup in March 2013 
and both museums are housed in the Mauá Square (Praça Mauá, see Figure 5). The Museum of 
Tomorrow (Museu do Amanhã) is a lavish waterfront building erected at the Pier Mauá in late 
2015, designed by lauded Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava (Carvalho, 2016; Sanchez & 
Essex, 2017). At first glance, the museum is seen to project the values and practices of 
sustainability in its engineering and internal exhibitions, blending art and science and enabling 
visitors to envisage an ecologically sound future (Watts, 2015). These developments enacted 
were perceived to be marginal to the 2016 Olympics, but they have become increasingly 
intertwined with the preparation of the Games (Carvalho, 2016). Additionally, construction 
companies and other corporate interests (e.g. office towers, hotels) played a major role in 
expediting Porto Maravilha’s regeneration plans (Ribeiro & Junior, 2017; Silvestre, 2016).  
<<<FIGURE 5 HERE>>> 
Ancillary Infrastructure, Facility Development and Urban Spatial Transformation 
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Reconfigurations catalysed by the Porto Maravilha project have changed the dynamics in 
the Pier Mauá plaza, as emphasised by a number of interviewees. One cultural organisation 
exemplified that the land was “completely destroyed... it was a bus parking lot... nothing 
happened here before it was a dead zone... with this project, what happened is that you have a 
completely renovated area”. Although, these physical environmental changes could deter 
desirable outputs for the local, deprived populations and spark gentrification processes in the port 
area. One participant remarked that there was a “high social cost... but it’s more of an aesthetic 
thing, just a facade. It looks good but is it really good because we still have problems with 
health, and education and security...” In the media, misleading figures have circulated and been 
reported on concerning the costs of the construction of architectural installations and facilities in 
Porto Maravilha. Figures relating to the Museum of Tomorrow are disputed from £40m or $59m 
(Watts, 2015) to claims from one interviewee of astronomical levels of R$245 million. On the 
face of it, a range of hard infrastructure implementations did not satisfactory meet local demand 
for facilities (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Li, 2013; Thornley, 2002). 
Moving out from the main Porto Maravilha precinct, poor quality of facilities for the 
local community is evident. For example, this is reflected in the sad state of affairs of the 
Gamboa Olympic Village (Vila Olímpica da Gamboa, see Figure 6-1 and 6-2). The venue was 
inaugurated in 2004 as a recreation centre and physical site designed to support sport and leisure 
activities (e.g. athletics, swimming and skateboarding) for the local community in Gamboa. This 
perspective was emphasised by a local tour operator who reiterated the depressing sights of the 
facility: “this use to be setup as a skate park. You can see there was a track here for running and 
you can see the condition of this and a football installation... they build it and leave, there’s no 
maintenance, there’s no budget to take care of this stuff... This park use to be a really nice 
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facility when they opened it. It’s absolutely shocking!” The current situation of the infrastructure 
and recreation sites has demonstrated minimal preparation to feasibly maintain and upkeep the 
conditions of the facilities. In a number of instances, infrastructure and venues have been left 
redundant. 
<<<FIGURES 6-1 and 6-2 HERE>>> 
On the other hand, some would argue the outlook of the rejuvenated port is a clear 
improvement, recognising all the physical structures that sprung up from this development and 
renovated ‘Olympic Boulevard’ (Boulevard Olimpico). A cultural centre spoke positively about 
the transformation of the port and the signals emanating from the residential market, “we are 
looking very optimistic about the Porto Maravilha project. But we know that takes time and it’s 
important that the residential area of Porto Maravilha becomes a success”. However, in terms 
of real estate development and the corporate vacancy rate, a plethora of factors have influenced 
the current stock of retail and industrial office space in the port. Developing and retaining 
international corporations is a prevalent issue in Porto Maravilha. This is illustrated through the 
widespread empty and dilapidated corporate offices and towers littering the skyline (see Figure 
7). 
<<<FIGURE 7 HERE>>> 
Real-time analysis post-Games found that Rio de Janeiro’s ex-Olympic event public 
spaces and dwellings have been designated to stage temporary events. A couple of the 
interviewees highlighted the central port area acting as a springboard and focal point as public 
space opportunities start to ripen for commercial event animation (Smith, 2018), including Praça 
Mauá and the Olympic Boulevard. One participant stated these spaces are “areas that allow for 
these big events and shows”. Spatial transformations in Praça Mauá have led to new initiatives 
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such as pop-up markets. Another interviewee mentioned events developed in partnership with 
local cultural partners (e.g. museums) in the port zone, including the debut of the Rio de Janeiro 
Women of the World Festival (Festival Mulheres do Mundo, 2018). This festival is described as 
a celebration of the achievements of women and the inaugural edition landed in Rio in 
November 2018.  
Urban Transport Network: Targeted Removal or Inclusive Improvements? 
A sign of the planning and targeted interventions in Porto Maravilha is the 
implementation of the light rail vehicle (VLT). The government promise was to add substantial 
investment in transportation to connect routes stretching in and out of Porto Maravilha. Paes’ 
ideas on the transit reforms were to link the transport networks - metro, buses and airports, 
particularly the 28km light rail from Gamboa to Central to Santos Dumont terminal (Carvalho, 
2016; CDURP, 2016). Key stations related to this study have been mapped and illustrated in 
Figure 5. The controversy was evident surrounding which members of the local community the 
VLT served and the planned placement of the VLT tracks on streets. This assertion was 
highlighted by some participants, who claimed that “it’s not a means of transportation. It’s not a 
means of transportation... it’s a means of changing the neighbourhood, of valuing the 
neighbourhood”. In this sense, problems in assembling the integrated transport system were the 
ongoing dilemmas faced by city planners, policymakers and the local organising committee. In 
some extreme cases for neighbourhoods urban planning devices like the execution of the VLT 
have dogmatically reaped chaos upon citizens, leaving behind a homogenised, characterless 
ghost town - awaiting the next urban retail market pump. Accessibility and the temporary 
creation of transport systems for the local population was a highly questionable tactic pursued by 
the local authority.  
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Our analysis has presented multiple examples of infrastructure development as a 
consequence of hosting an MSE. Both cases demonstrated issues during the planning phase 
which ultimately lead to deficient legacy outcomes for the cities under the spotlight. The time 
constraints between being awarded host city status and delivering finished infrastructure often 
invite complications for the local organising committee and the state. For example, the seats in 
the Arena Pantanal were charged at a premium as the suppliers knew the constructors were 
working to a deadline. The seat suppliers were then able to profit at the expense of the taxpayer. 
A lack of transparency in the negotiation of contracts has had long term impacts. The final bill 
for taxpayers in Rio is still unclear as contradictory reports on the costs circulate. In Cuiabá, the 
difficulties surrounding negotiating contractual agreements meant the VLT was not completed 
and the governor was imprisoned. 
These underlying issues in the preparation phase have led to more widespread 
ramifications for both host cities. There has been no funding set aside for maintenance of venues 
and facilities in Rio de Janeiro and there are office building blocks standing empty. In Cuiabá, 
the VLT still remains unfinished and the stadium is falling into disrepair. These case studies have 
shown how external actors have been able to influence the development of infrastructure 
projects. This includes the federal and state governments, sports organising bodies, international 
corporations, and the local population. Each of these actors has their own agendas and has 
different abilities to influence outcomes, however, this is not static and can shift as priorities, 
funding and time scale change. In Table 1, we have provided a detailed review of the parallels 
and disparities relating to planning and infrastructure impacts which emerged from the two host 
city destinations. 
<<<TABLE 1 HERE>>> 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we intended to provide rich, empirical and critical insights to establish the 
state of planned infrastructure development and returns post mega sporting event (MSE). The 
two case settings in question, Cuiabá and Porto Maravilha illustrate how the infrastructure and 
urban legacies have been created and delivered in the short-term. The review of the literature 
established what is not known in terms of the physical legacies. For example, the legacy of these 
infrastructure works attached to the events’ bid preparation and delivery, and how this co-existed 
and operated within the confines of policy and decision-making. In this regard, understanding the 
production of these legacies across the MSE lifecycle is pivotal. Particularly how they are 
conceived across multiple locations, coupled with how key stakeholders seize upon the power to 
influence the eventual manifestation of legacy plans. Hence, MSE bidding and planning has been 
explored in order to make a judgement on the host cities physical and spatial legacies. 
A number of persistent issues have been stressed in relation to the hosting capacity of the 
city or nation i.e. Brazil. For instance, the role and demands of ‘collective elites’ (e.g. public 
authority and local organising committee) in pushing through their local infrastructure agenda. In 
these examples, primary infrastructure as categorised by Li (2013) accounted for an extensive 
proportion of requirements e.g. Cuiabá’s Arena Pantanal. The importance of ancillary facilities 
encompassing museums and the extension of commercial buildings or units were more 
prominent in Rio de Janeiro - mainly due to the increased tourist numbers anticipated in this 
area. However, similarities can be drawn relating to the spiralling operational costs and 
budgetary management of both sites. In mega sporting event led planning and development, 
analysis of Cuiabá’s and Porto Maravilha’s urban projects highlights the lack of broader long-
term thinking around how facilities are designed and organised. This includes visions for the 
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positioning of ancillary infrastructure renovations, and dynamic interactions with urban ‘Live 
Site’ public space regeneration (Smith, 2018), to new or upgraded urban transport systems. 
Across the board, host community involvement in the decision-making process was absent. 
Applied to the context of the Global South, this examination delves into the critical 
relationship between MSE planning and urban infrastructure and renewal (Li, 2013). The cloud 
of uncertainty surrounding the degree to which infrastructure programmes are seen to be 
unfinished and often terminated, grounding to halt at the various MSE phases is surely a missed 
opportunity for Brazil. Instead, hosting cities have become burdened by a political infliction 
which ignores citizen-led initiatives, in exchange for the pursuit of aesthetically homogenous, 
built-material city infrastructure. 
Drawing upon the notions and distinctions of infrastructure costs and benefits to a host 
city or nation, this article explored how the evolving corruption saga serves to derail 
infrastructure projects and threatens the instability of the host city environment. State actors were 
seen to be engulfed in multiple corruption scandals, which have been identified and discussed in 
both city settings of Cuiabá and Rio de Janeiro. To limit and address these corruption concerns, 
MSE planning and bidding procedures must actively deal with issues of transparency. Global and 
pan-European bodies (e.g. FIFA, UEFA) have started to respond to these challenges posed to 
host cities. For instance, as part of the reformed 2026 FIFA Football World Cup bidding process, 
transparency is now listed as a key principle (FIFA, 2017). Likewise, within the planning and 
procedures of the 2024 Olympiad, the IOC, has brought to the fore a number of anti-corruption 
practices to combat fraudulent activity (IOC, 2017). Changes to regulatory structures could 
enable hosting cities to amend, retract or veto certain event requirements if the stadiums and 
venues are thought to be unnecessary and usable. Furthermore, more incentives could be offered 
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to hosting cities to develop temporary venues or replicate similar approaches devised for major 
sporting events, specifically, the 2018 Gold Coast Commonwealth Games. In this instance, the 
organisers created a venues and services division responsible for the planning and delivery of 
temporary and permanent infrastructure services (Gold Coast 2018 XXI Commonwealth Games, 
2017, p. 26). Holistic and integrated sustainability policies and corporate social responsibility 
instruments may assist in coping with infrastructure resource frailties, such as facility size, as 
well as negating the possibilities of political figureheads benefiting from engaging in corruption 
and bribery as a consequence of planning and bidding to host an MSE. 
This paper made two contributions to the mega sporting event literature. Firstly, it 
answered calls to further understand the ‘Global South’ experience of MSE hosting (Maharaj, 
2015). This is particularly important as more developing countries are set to host MSE events in 
the future. With lower levels of public expenditure than their Global North counterparts, they are 
more susceptible to corporate sector exploitation. Secondly, we have contributed to the growing 
focus on pre-event planning as the catalyst for transforming post-event outcomes. Here, it was 
found that the plethora of actors with different agendas and scope for influence attempt to assert 
their demands on the bidding and planning stages. This has been visualised in the “HEEPI” 
Nexus model which was conceptualised earlier on in this paper. Further research directions could 
be directed toward exploring the relationship between MSE facility developments, the 
expectations of locals and achieving social outcomes. Longitudinal studies are necessary to tease 
out venue construction operational issues and evaluate the infrastructure decision-making 
processes of various relationships between government officials, policymakers and building 
contractors. To this end, the study provides a critical event studies perspective and an in-depth 
picture of large-scale flagship development programmes. Mechanisms and approaches for 
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maintaining longer-term investments in the physical landscape have to be realistic and 
manageable, which considers local, host community participation and inclusion to ultimately 
derive benefits from heavy infrastructure and facility construction. 
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Table 1. 
Host City Review of Planning and Infrastructure Impacts 
Key Host City Themes Cuiabá and Porto Maravilha, Rio de Janeiro Case Study Focus and Impact 
Budgets and costs • Original costs have overrun their estimations. In Cuiabá, the bus expressway was initially expected to 
cost R$488.8 million (£114,732,167) but this was replaced by the VLT at a staggering cost of 
R$1.477 billion (£346,684,555), funded by public finances. 
• The construction costs for Porto Maravilha’s prodigious installations (e.g. Museum of Tomorrow) are 
contested and surpassed their projected budgets (Watts, 2015). 
Infrastructure construction and 
transportation plans 
• Unfinished infrastructure development programme - The Arena Pantanal (Cuiabá) did not receive the 
planned international environmental accreditation as construction was not finished on time. Disputes 
between the state government and construction company led to R$28 million (£6,572,219) being 
withheld from the construction company. 
• Delayed and/or cancelled projects - Cuiabá’s new light railway system (VLT) was not completed in 
time for the 2014 World Cup, due to a number of major construction delays and contractual 
disagreements. The Governor signed contracts worth RS1.4 billion (£328,610,953) and the project 
remains unfinished at the time of writing. 
• Transportation faults - In Rio de Janeiro, implementing the VLT project contributed to widespread 
disruption and eroded access for local communities, especially in areas such as Gamboa. The 
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controversy was also evident with regards to the location and routes of the VLT, and which 
communities the VLT served to benefit. 
Stadiums, venues and ancillary 
facilities 
• Stadia and venue usage - Due to the lack of strategic longer-term foresight in both cities, some venues 
and facilities remain under-utilised. Although the Arena Pantanal’s capacity was reduced after the 
2014 World Cup, the stadium possesses many of the facets of a ‘white elephant’. 
• Ancillary infrastructure and recreational facilities - The planning and integration of key ancillary 
facilities (e.g. the Rio Museum of Art and the Museum of Tomorrow) was poorly designed, 
coordinated and ineffective in its execution. Moreover, the recreation centre and site, Gamboa 
Olympic Village, has fallen into a dire state of disrepair and is therefore not able to fulfil its role in 
supporting local community sport and leisure activity. 
Real estate development • Abandonment and unoccupied urban space - In the port region of Rio de Janeiro, empty buildings, 
abandoned office towers and industrial space can be linked to the development of real estate. This has 
exacerbated corporate vacancy rates in Porto Maravilha when compared to other districts in the city. 
Transparency and corruption • Corruption scandals - The Governor in Mato Grosso was charged with misusing public funds - VLT 
expenditure contributed to this conviction. Substantial evidence in the two host cities points to how 
the political elites were the beneficiaries to the detriment of the local communities, commuters and 
the natural environment. 
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Figure 1. Host Event Project Planning for Infrastructure Nexus 
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Figure 2. Location of Cuiabá, capital city of Mato Grosso state, Brazil (Callejas, de Oliveira, de 
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Figure 3. Map of Cuiabá showing the VLT linking the airport to central Cuiabá. The Arena 
Pantanal is indicated by the green dot (Mobilize, 2014). 
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Figure 4-1 and 4-2. The VLT railway in Cuiabá, an unfinished infrastructure programme 
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Figure 5. Overview of Porto Maravilha Districts and Urban Infrastructure Development Zones 
(based on CDURP, 2016; RioOnWatch, 2016, and author’s emphasis). 
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Figure 6-1 and 6-2. Gamboa Olympic Village (author’s own photographs) 
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Figure 7. Empty Corporate Office Building (author’s own photograph). 
